Independence with Partition

By early 1947, the constitutional machinery was paralysed. The League was in the Interim Government but sabotaging it. The Constituent Assembly was meeting without the League. Communal riots were consuming Punjab and Bengal. The Cabinet Mission Plan was a dead letter. Against this backdrop, Attlee's announcement on February 20, 1947 introduced a firm deadline for British withdrawal — transforming an open-ended constitutional crisis into a countdown to partition.

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Facing a constitutional deadlock, Prime Minister Clement Attlee made a landmark announcement before the British House of Commons:

Main Points:

1. A firm deadline of June 30, 1948 was fixed for transfer of power — even if Indian politicians had not agreed on a constitution by then
2. The British would relinquish power either to some form of central government or, if the Constituent Assembly was not fully representative (i.e., Muslim-majority provinces did not join), to existing provincial governments in some areas
3. British powers and obligations vis-à-vis the princely states would lapse with transfer of power — but would NOT be transferred to any successor government in British India
4. Mountbatten would replace Wavell as Viceroy

The statement contained clear hints of both partition and even Balkanisation — the possibility of numerous successor states — and was in essence a reversion to the logic of the Cripps Offer.

Why a Date Was Fixed:

• To shock the parties into reaching an agreement
• To avert the developing constitutional crisis
• To convince Indians of British sincerity
• To acknowledge the irreversible decline of British authority — as Wavell had assessed in October 1946

Congress's Reading: The provision allowing power transfer to existing provincial governments was acceptable to Congress — it meant the existing Constituent Assembly could proceed to frame a constitution for areas represented by it, providing a way out of the deadlock. However, the statement emboldened the League to launch a civil disobedience movement to overthrow the Unionist coalition government in Punjab.

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March 10, 1947: Nehru stated that the Cabinet Mission Plan was the best solution if carried out; but the only real alternative was the partition of Punjab and Bengal.

April 1947: Congress President Kripalani communicated to the Viceroy: "rather than have a battle, we shall let them have their Pakistan provided you allow Bengal and Punjab to be partitioned in a fair manner."

The most insistent pressure for partition came from Hindu and Sikh communal groups in Bengal and Punjab who feared compulsory grouping would place them inside Pakistan. The Hindu Mahasabha in Bengal was actively assessing the feasibility of a separate Hindu province in West Bengal.

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Before the Mountbatten Plan, Mountbatten formulated an alternative he called Plan Balkan (also known as the Dickie Bird Plan). It envisaged:

• Transfer of power to separate provinces (or to a confederation if formed before transfer)
• Punjab and Bengal given the option to vote for partition of their provinces
• Various units thus formed, along with princely states (rendered independent by lapse of paramountcy), would have the option of joining India, Pakistan, or remaining separate

This plan would have resulted in the Balkanisation of India into numerous mini-states. Nehru reacted violently to it when shown it by V.P. Menon, and the plan was quickly abandoned.

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Mountbatten had an advantage over predecessors — he was informally given more powers to decide things on the spot and benefited from the British government's firm resolve to quit at the earliest. His task was to explore options of unity and division till October 1947, then advise on the form of transfer of power.

He soon found: the Cabinet Mission Plan was a dead horse; Jinnah was unyielding on a sovereign state. A serious attempt at unity would have required actively supporting pro-unity forces and countering the League. Mountbatten preferred to woo both sides — his formula was to divide India but retain maximum unity.

One major innovation (actually suggested by V.P. Menon) was the idea of immediate transfer of power on the basis of dominion status (with a right of secession) — obviating the need to wait for a new constitution to be agreed upon in the Constituent Assembly.

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Main Points

1. Punjab and Bengal Legislative Assemblies would meet in two groups — Hindus and Muslims — to vote for partition. If a simple majority of either group voted for partition, the provinces would be partitioned.
2. In case of partition, two dominions and two Constituent Assemblies would be created.
3. Sindh would take its own decision on joining India or Pakistan.
4. Referendums in NWFP and Sylhet district of Bengal would decide their fate.
5. Since Congress had conceded a unified India, all their other key demands were met:
   • Independence for princely states ruled out — they must join either India or Pakistan
   • Independence for Bengal ruled out
   • Accession of Hyderabad to Pakistan ruled out (Mountbatten personally supported Congress on this)
   • Freedom to come on August 15, 1947
   • A Boundary Commission to be set up for partition

Mountbatten's formula: Divide India, but retain maximum unity. League's demand was conceded (Pakistan would be created); Congress's position was taken into account to make Pakistan as small as possible.

What Happened Province by Province

• Bengal: Legislative Assembly voted for partition → East Bengal → Pakistan; West Bengal → India
• Punjab: Legislative Assembly voted for partition → West Punjab → Pakistan; East Punjab → India
• Sylhet referendum: Voted for incorporation into East Bengal (Pakistan)
• NWFP referendum: Voted for Pakistan; Provincial Congress refrained from the referendum
• Baluchistan and Sindh: Threw in their lot with Pakistan

Why Congress Accepted Dominion Status

Despite the Lahore Congress (1929) spirit of Poorna Swaraj, Congress accepted Dominion Status because:

1. It ensured peaceful and quick transfer of power
2. It was more important to assume authority to check the explosive communal situation
3. It allowed continuity in the bureaucracy and the army — both critical for governance

For Britain, dominion status offered a chance to keep India in the Commonwealth — at least temporarily — given India's economic strength, defence potential and trade value.

Rationale for August 15, 1947 (earlier than the June 30, 1948 deadline): Britain wanted to secure Congress's agreement to dominion status quickly, and an early date allowed Britain to escape responsibility for the deteriorating communal situation.

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• Introduced in British Parliament: July 5, 1947
• Royal Assent: July 18, 1947
• Implemented: August 15, 1947

Key Provisions:

• Creation of two independent dominions — India and Pakistan — from August 15, 1947
• Pakistan became independent on August 14; India on August 15
• Each dominion to have a Governor-General responsible for effective operation of the Act
• The Constituent Assembly of each dominion to exercise powers of the legislature
• Existing Central Legislative Assembly and Council of States dissolved automatically
• Till a new constitution was adopted, governments to be carried on under the Government of India Act, 1935
• M.A. Jinnah became first Governor-General of Pakistan
• India requested Lord Mountbatten to continue as Governor-General of India

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Mountbatten's breakneck speed caused serious anomalies and totally failed to prevent the Punjab massacre because:

1. There were no transitional institutional structures within which partition problems could be tackled
2. Mountbatten had hoped to be the common Governor-General of India and Pakistan to provide continuity — but Jinnah wanted the position for himself in Pakistan, ending this arrangement
3. The Boundary Commission Award (under Radcliffe) was ready by August 12, 1947 — but Mountbatten deliberately delayed its announcement until after August 15 so that Britain could escape responsibility for partition-related disturbances

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During 1946–47, a new upsurge of State People's Movements demanded political rights and representation in the Constituent Assembly. Nehru presided over the All India State People's Conference sessions at Udaipur (1945) and Gwalior (April 1947), declaring that states refusing to join the CA would be treated as hostile.

In July 1947, Vallabhbhai Patel took charge of the new States Department. Integration took place in two phases:

Phase I — By August 15, 1947

All states except Kashmir, Hyderabad and Junagarh signed an Instrument of Accession, acknowledging central authority over defence, external affairs and communications.

Princes agreed easily because:

• They were 'surrendering' only what they never had (these three functions had been part of British paramountcy, not princely sovereignty)
• There was no change in internal political structure

Phase II — Integration and Constitutional Change

A more difficult process of full territorial and political integration — merging states with neighbouring provinces or into new units:

• Kathiawar Union
• Vindhya and Madhya Pradesh
• Rajasthan
• Himachal Pradesh
• Internal constitutional changes in states like Hyderabad, Mysore, Travancore-Cochin

This phase was accomplished within a year. The principal bait: a generous privy purse. Some princes were made governors and rajpramukhs in free India.

Patel's greatest achievement: The rapid political unification of the country after independence.

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Why Congress Accepted Partition

1. Long-term failure to integrate Muslim masses: Congress succeeded in building sufficient nationalist consciousness to force the British out, but failed to weld the nation — especially to integrate Muslims into a unified national movement. Partition reflects the success-failure dichotomy of the Congress-led anti-imperialist movement.

2. Communal violence was beyond control: Only an immediate transfer of power could forestall the spread of direct action and communal riots. The virtual collapse of the Interim Government made Pakistan appear unavoidable.

3. Avoiding Balkanisation: The partition plan ruled out independence for princely states — had partition not been accepted on these terms, the princely states might have remained independent, producing far greater fragmentation.

4. Step-by-step concessions — the slippery slope:

   • Cripps Mission (1942): Autonomy of Muslim-majority provinces accepted
   • Gandhi-Jinnah talks (1944): Gandhi accepted the right of self-determination of Muslim-majority provinces
   • After Cabinet Mission Plan (1946): Congress conceded the possibility of Muslim-majority provinces setting up a separate Constituent Assembly; later accepted compulsory grouping (December 1946)
   • March 1947: CWC resolution stated Punjab (and by implication Bengal) must be partitioned if the country was divided
   • June 3, 1947 (3rd June Plan): Congress formally accepted partition

5. Wishful thinking by Congress leadership: Nehru at various times stated — "Once the British left, Hindu-Muslim differences would be patched up"; ; — all of which proved grievously wrong.

Gandhi's Helplessness

Gandhi felt helpless because the communalisation of the people had already occurred. He could not launch a movement against communalism using a communalised people. He accepted partition as the people's will but asked Congressmen not to accept it in their hearts.

Historiographical Views on Partition

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• GS Paper I — Modern India: The Mountbatten Plan and Indian Independence Act are the final constitutional milestones — connecting backward to August Offer → Cripps → Cabinet Mission and forward to the Constitution of India.
• Federalism and Princely States: Phase I and Phase II integration under Patel is a direct precursor to India's federal structure and is relevant to GS II on centre-state relations, Article 370 (Jammu & Kashmir) and the special position of former princely states.
• Institutional Design: The Indian Independence Act's provision that the Government of India Act, 1935 would serve as the interim constitutional framework until a new constitution was adopted is directly relevant to how the Indian Constitution was drafted.
• Historiography: The multi-perspective section (Nehru, Patel, Azad, Wali Khan, R.J. Moore, Mazumdar, Jinnah) is a UPSC favourite — understanding who argued what about the causes of partition is tested in both Prelims and Mains.
• Integration vs Partition: Patel's integration of 562+ princely states is often counterposed to partition in questions about the achievement of Indian territorial unity.
• V.P. Menon's role: The idea of immediate transfer on dominion status basis — the key innovation of the Mountbatten Plan — was Menon's suggestion, not Mountbatten's own. Frequently overlooked.

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• Attlee's deadline: June 30, 1948 — NOT August 15, 1947. The actual date of August 15, 1947 was chosen later by Mountbatten, ahead of the original deadline.
• Wavell replaced by Mountbatten: This was announced in Attlee's February 20, 1947 statement — NOT after the Mountbatten Plan was announced in June.
• Plan Balkan vs Mountbatten Plan: Plan Balkan was an earlier, Balkanisation-risking proposal formulated between March and May 1947 — ABANDONED after Nehru's objections. The Mountbatten (or 3rd June) Plan came after. Do NOT confuse them.
• V.P. Menon's contribution: The idea of immediate transfer on dominion status was Menon's suggestion — not Mountbatten's original idea.
• Sylhet referendum: Sylhet was a district of Assam (not Bengal) that chose to go with East Bengal (Pakistan) in the referendum — resulting in it being transferred to Pakistan. A commonly confused geographical detail.
• NWFP referendum: The Provincial Congress refrained from the NWFP referendum (did not participate) — it did NOT vote against Pakistan. The referendum result was in favour of Pakistan.
• Radcliffe Award timing: The Boundary Commission Award was ready by August 12 but was deliberately withheld until after August 15 — so Britain could escape responsibility. This is a key causal explanation for why Punjab violence was not prevented.
• Pakistan's independence date: Pakistan became independent on August 14 (NOT August 15). India on August 15.
• Governor-Generals: Jinnah became Pakistan's first Governor-General. Mountbatten continued as India's Governor-General — he was NOT the first Indian Governor-General (that was C. Rajagopalachari, from 1948).

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• Attlee's statement: Feb 20, 1947; deadline June 30, 1948; power to central govt OR provincial govts; princely states' paramountcy lapses but not transferred; Mountbatten replaces Wavell
• Plan Balkan: Mar–May 1947; transfer to separate provinces; Balkanisation risk; abandoned after Nehru's objection
• Mountbatten Plan: June 3, 1947; key innovation = V.P. Menon's dominion status + immediate transfer idea
• Bengal + Punjab assemblies vote on partition (simple majority of either group sufficient); Sindh decides own; referendums in NWFP and Sylhet
• Results: East Bengal + West Punjab = Pakistan; West Bengal + East Punjab = India; Sylhet → East Bengal (Pakistan); NWFP → Pakistan (Congress refrained); Sindh + Baluchistan → Pakistan
• Congress accepted dominion status: peaceful transfer + authority to check riots + bureaucratic/army continuity
• August 15 chosen (not June 30, 1948): secure agreement + escape communal responsibility
• Indian Independence Act: introduced Jul 5, royal assent Jul 18, implemented Aug 15, 1947
• Pakistan independence: Aug 14; India: Aug 15; Jinnah = 1st GG Pakistan; Mountbatten continues as GG India
• Radcliffe Award ready Aug 12 — deliberately withheld till after Aug 15
• Integration Phase I: all except Kashmir, Hyderabad, Junagarh by Aug 15; only 3 subjects (defence, external affairs, communications)
• Integration Phase II: territorial merger into new units; bait = privy purse + governor/rajpramukh roles; completed within a year
• Step-by-step concessions: 1942 (Cripps) → 1944 (Gandhi-Jinnah) → 1946 (Cabinet Mission) → Dec 1946 (compulsory grouping) → Mar 1947 (CWC on Punjab/Bengal) → Jun 3, 1947 (partition accepted)
• Key views: Nehru (tired men), Patel (several Pakistans feared), Azad (not accepted freely), Wali Khan (British geopolitics), R.J. Moore (devolution inherently divisive), Mazumdar (INA trials biggest factor), Jinnah (typewriter quote)