Rise of the Marathas, Aurangzeb's Deccan Policy and Mughal Decline

The Marathas had important positions in the administrative and military systems of Ahmadnagar and Bijapur. Their power and influence in the affairs of government had grown as the Mughals advanced towards the Deccan. Both the Deccani sultans and the Mughals made bids for their support. Malik Ambar used them in his army in large numbers as loose auxiliaries.

A number of influential Maratha families — the Mores, the Ghatages, the Nimbalkars, etc. — exercised local authority in some areas. However, the Marathas did not have any large, well-established states as the Rajputs had. The credit for setting up such a large state goes to Shahji Bhonsale and his son, Shivaji.

Shahji acted as the kingmaker in Ahmadnagar, and defied the Mughals. By the treaty of 1636, Shahji yielded the territories he was dominating. He joined the service of Bijapur and turned his energies to Karnataka. Taking advantage of unsettled conditions, Shahji tried to set up a semi-independent principality at Bangalore. He left the Poona jagir to his neglected senior wife, Jija Bai, and his minor son, Shivaji.

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Shivaji showed his mettle at the young age of 18 when he overran a number of hill forts near Poona — Rajgarh, Kondana and Torna — in the years 1645–47. With the death of his guardian, Dadaji Kondadeo, in 1647, Shivaji became his own master and the full control of his father's jagir passed under him.

Shivaji began his real career of conquest in 1656 when he conquered Javli from the Maratha chief, Chandra Rao More. The Javli kingdom and the accumulated treasure of the Mores were important, and Shivaji acquired them by means of treachery. The conquest of Javli made him the undisputed master of the Mavala area (highlands) and freed his path to the Satara area and to the coastal strip, the Konkan. Mavali foot-soldiers became a strong part of his army.

The Mughal invasion of Bijapur in 1657 saved Shivaji from Bijapuri reprisal. Shivaji first entered into negotiations with Aurangzeb and asked for the grant of all the Bijapuri territories he held, including the port of Dabhol in the Konkan. Shivaji then changed sides and made deep inroads into Mughal areas, seizing rich booty. When Aurangzeb came to terms with the new Bijapur ruler in preparation for the civil war, he pardoned Shivaji but also distrusted him and advised the Bijapur ruler to expel him from the Bijapuri areas he had seized, and employ him in Karnataka — away from the Mughal frontiers.

With Aurangzeb away in the north, Shivaji resumed his career of conquest at the expense of Bijapur. He burst into the Konkan, the coastal strip between the Ghats and the sea, and seized the northern part of it. Bijapur sent against Shivaji a premier Bijapuri noble, Afzal Khan, at the head of 10,000 troops, with instructions to capture him by any means possible. Treachery was common in those days and both Afzal Khan and Shivaji had resorted to treachery on a number of occasions. Shivaji's forces were not used to open fighting and shrank from an open contest with this powerful chief. Afzal Khan sent an invitation to Shivaji for a personal interview, promising to get him pardoned. Convinced this was a trap, Shivaji went prepared and murdered Afzal Khan (1659) in a cunning but daring manner. Shivaji put his leaderless army to rout and captured all his goods and equipment including his artillery. Flushed with victory, the Maratha troops overran the powerful fort of Panhala and poured into south Konkan and the Kolhapur districts making extensive conquests.

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After the failure of Shaista Khan, Aurangzeb deputed Raja Jai Singh of Amber — one of the most trusted advisers of Aurangzeb — to deal with Shivaji. Full military and administrative authority was conferred on Jai Singh so that he was not dependent on the Mughal viceroy in the Deccan. Unlike his predecessors, Jai Singh did not underestimate the Marathas. He made careful diplomatic and military preparations and appealed to all the rivals and opponents of Shivaji, even tried to win over the sultan of Bijapur in order to isolate Shivaji. Marching to Poona, Jai Singh decided to strike at the heart of Shivaji's territories — fort Purandar — where Shivaji had lodged his family and treasure. Jai Singh closely besieged Purandar (1665), beating off all Maratha attempts to relieve it.

Terms of Treaty of Purandar (1665)

• Out of 35 forts held by Shivaji, 23 forts with surrounding territory yielding a revenue of four lakhs of huns a year to be surrendered to the Mughals; the remaining 12 forts with an annual income of one lakh of huns were to be left to Shivaji "on condition of service and loyalty to the throne."
• Territory worth four lakhs of huns a year in the Bijapuri Konkan (which Shivaji had already held) was granted to him. In addition, the Bijapur territory worth five lakhs of huns a year in the uplands (Balaghat) which Shivaji was to conquer, was also granted to him. In return for these, he was to pay 40 lakhs huns in instalments to the Mughals.
• Shivaji asked to be excused from personal service — hence a mansab of 5000 was granted in his place to his minor son, Sambhaji. Shivaji promised, however, to join personally in any Mughal campaign in the Deccan.

Jai Singh cleverly threw a bone of contention between Shivaji and the Bijapuri ruler. But the success of Jai Singh's scheme depended upon Mughal support to Shivaji in making up from Bijapur territory worth the amount he had yielded to the Mughals. This proved to be the fatal flaw — Aurangzeb had not lost his reservations about Shivaji and was doubtful of the wisdom of a joint Mughal-Maratha attack on Bijapur.

Jai Singh considered the alliance with Shivaji the starting point of the conquest of Bijapur and the entire Deccan. He told Aurangzeb: "We shall hem Shiva in like the centre of a circle." However, the Mughal-Maratha expedition against Bijapur failed. Shivaji who had been deputed to capture fort Panhala was also unsuccessful. Seeing his grandiose scheme collapsing, Jai Singh persuaded Shivaji to visit the emperor at Agra. If Shivaji and Aurangzeb could be reconciled, Jai Singh thought, Aurangzeb might be persuaded to give greater resources for a renewed invasion of Bijapur.

But the Agra visit proved to be a disaster. Shivaji felt insulted when he was put in the category of mansabdars of 5000 — the rank which had been granted earlier to his minor son. Nor did the emperor, whose birthday was being celebrated, find time to speak to Shivaji. Hence, Shivaji walked off angrily and refused imperial service. Shivaji escaped from detention (1666) — the manner of his escape is too well known to be repeated. Aurangzeb always blamed himself for his carelessness in allowing Shivaji to escape.

The Agra visit proved to be the turning point for Mughal relations with the Marathas. For two years after his return home, Shivaji kept quiet. But Aurangzeb's stubborn reservations about Shivaji, refusal to recognise his importance and attaching a low price to his friendship, was one of the biggest political mistakes made by Aurangzeb.

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Aurangzeb virtually goaded Shivaji into resuming his career of conquest by insisting upon a narrow interpretation of the treaty of Purandar — although with the failure of the Bijapur expedition, the bottom had dropped out of the treaty. Shivaji could not be reconciled to the loss of 23 forts and territory worth four lakhs huns a year to the Mughals without any compensation from Bijapur. He renewed the contest with the Mughals, sacking Surat a second time in 1670. During the next four years, he recovered a large number of his forts (including Purandar) and made deep inroads into Mughal territories, especially Berar and Khandesh.

Shivaji's Coronation (1674)

In 1674, Shivaji crowned himself formally at Rajgarh. By now, the most powerful among the Maratha chiefs, he could claim a status equal to the effete Deccani sultans. The formal coronation served a number of purposes:

• It placed him on a pedestal much higher than any of the Maratha chiefs.
• To strengthen his social position further, Shivaji married into some of the leading old Maratha families — the Mohites, the Shirkes, etc.
• A formal declaration was also made by the priest presiding over the function, Gaga Bhatt, that Shivaji was a high class kshatriya.
• As an independent ruler it now became possible for Shivaji to enter into treaties with the Deccani sultans on a footing of equality and not as a rebel.
• It was also an important step in the further growth of Maratha national sentiment.

Karnataka Expedition (1676)

In 1676 Shivaji undertook a bold new venture — with the active aid and support of his brothers Madanna and Akhanna at Hyderabad, he undertook an expedition into the Bijapuri Karnataka. Shivaji was given a grand welcome by the Qutb Shah at his capital and a formal agreement was arrived at. The Qutb Shah agreed to pay a subsidy of one lakh huns (five lakhs of rupees) annually to Shivaji. The territory and the booty gained in Karnataka was to be shared. Although Shivaji had assumed the title of "Haindava-Dharmoddharak" (Protector of the Hindu faith), he plundered mercilessly the Hindu population of the area. Returning home laden with treasure, Shivaji refused to share anything with the Qutb Shah, thus straining his relations with him.

The Karnataka expedition was the last major expedition of Shivaji. Shivaji died in 1680, shortly after his return.

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Shivaji's system of administration was largely borrowed from the administrative practices of the Deccani states. He designated eight ministers, sometimes called the Ashtapradhan — it was not in the nature of a council of ministers, each minister being directly responsible to the ruler.

Key Ministers

• Peshwa: The most important minister; looked after the finances and general administration.
• Sari-i-naubat (Senapati): Post of honour; generally given to one of the leading Maratha chiefs.
• Majumdar: The accountant.
• Waqenavis: Responsible for intelligence, posts, and household affairs.
• Surunavis/Chitnis: Helped the king with his correspondence.
• Dabir: Master of ceremonies; helped the king in his dealings with foreign powers.
• Nyayadhish and Panditrao: In charge of justice and charitable grants.

Army and Revenue

Shivaji preferred to give cash salaries to the regular soldiers, though sometimes the chiefs received revenue grants (saranjam). Strict discipline was maintained — no women or dancing girls were allowed to accompany the army. The plunder taken by each soldier during campaigns was strictly accounted for.

The regular army (paga) consisting of about 30,000 to 40,000 cavalry was distinct from the loose auxiliaries (silahdars), supervised by havaldars who received fixed salaries. Forts were carefully supervised; Maval footsoldiers and gunners were appointed for it. Three men of equal rank were placed in charge of each fort to guard against treachery.

The revenue system was patterned on the system of Malik Ambar. A new revenue assessment was completed by Annaji Datto in 1679. It is not correct to think that Shivaji abolished the zamindari (deshmukhi) system or that he did not award jagirs (mokasa) to his officials. However, Shivaji strictly supervised the mirasdars (those with hereditary rights in land).

Chauth and Sardeshmukhi:

• Chauth: A contribution on the neighbouring Mughal territories amounting to one-fourth (25%) of the land revenue. This supplemented his income.
• Sardeshmukhi: An additional 10% levy, claimed by Shivaji as hereditary right as the sardeshmukh (chief zamindar) of Maharashtra.

Shivaji not only proved to be an able general, a skilful tactician, and a shrewd diplomat — he also laid the foundation of a strong state by curbing the power of the deshmukhs. The army was an effective instrument of his policies where rapidity of movement was the most important factor. The state was regional in character, no doubt, but it definitely had a popular base. Shivaji was a popular king who represented the assertion of popular will in the area against Mughal encroachments.

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It is possible to trace three phases in the relations of Aurangzeb with the Deccani states.

Phase 1 (1658–68): Recovering Lost Territories

The main attempt was to recover from Bijapur the territories belonging to the Ahmadnagar state surrendered to it by the treaty of 1636. Kalyani and Bidar had been secured in 1657; Parenda was secured by bribe in 1660; Sholapur still remained.

Aurangzeb's expectation that the Adil Shah would willingly cooperate in the campaign against Shivaji was unrealistic. In 1636, Shah Jahan had given a huge bribe to the Adil Shah for giving his support against Shahji. Aurangzeb had nothing to offer to the Adil Shah except to surrender the gains of 1636. Yet, angered by Adil Shah's attitude of non-cooperation, Aurangzeb asked Jai Singh to punish both Shivaji and Adil Shah. Jai Singh, the astute politician, told Aurangzeb: "It would be unwise to attack both these fools at the same time."

However, Jai Singh was the only Mughal politician who advocated an all-out forward policy in the Deccan. He was of the opinion that the Maratha problem could not be solved without a forward policy — a conclusion to which Aurangzeb finally came 20 years later. The Mughal-Maratha Bijapur expedition of 1665 was bound to fail. The Deccanis adopted guerilla tactics and the Qutb Shah sent a large force to aid Bijapur. Jai Singh found that he had no means to assault the city (he had not brought siege guns) and to invest the city was impossible. The retreat proved costly. The disappointment and censures of Aurangzeb hastened Jai Singh's death (1667). The first phase was thus over with the surrender of Sholapur by bribery in 1668.

Phase 2 (1668–81): Pressurising Deccani States Against Marathas

The Mughals virtually marked time in the Deccan between 1668 and 1676. A new factor during this period was the rise to power of Madanna and Akhanna in Golconda. These two gifted brothers virtually ruled Golconda from 1672 almost till the extinction of the state in 1687. The brothers followed a policy of trying to establish a tripartite alliance between Golconda, Bijapur, and Shivaji. This policy was periodically disturbed by faction fights at the Bijapur court and by the overweening ambition of Shivaji.

The first intervention took place in 1676 following the overthrow of the Bijapur regent Khawas Khan who had agreed to join the Mughals against Shivaji for a price — Mughal help for the destruction of his domestic rivals, the Afghans! The invasion had to contend with the united opposition of the Bijapur and Golconda forces. Although the Mughals secured possession of Naldurg and Gulbarga by bribery, the basic objective of placing a pro-Mughal and anti-Maratha group in power could not be realised.

Aurangzeb now made a new approach. The Mughal viceroy, Bahadur Khan, was recalled. An Afghan noble and soldier, Diler Khan, who had good relations with the Afghan faction in Bijapur, was placed in command. Diler Khan persuaded the Afghan leader Bahlol Khan to join an expedition against Golconda. However, the Golconda ruler had openly welcomed Shivaji in his capital, while Madanna and Akhanna virtually ruled the state. The failure of the Mughal-Bijapur attack (1677) was in no small measure due to the firm leadership of Madanna and Akhanna. At the instance of the Qutb Shah, it was agreed that Sidi Masud, the leader of the Deccani party, would become the regent; that six lakh rupees would be paid to Sidi Masud to pay off the arrears of the Afghan soldiers who would then be disbanded; and that a resident from Golconda would advise the Bijapuri administration. This marks the high watermark of Hyderabadi influence over Bijapur and in the politics of the Deccan.

The last desperate effort of Diler Khan to capture Bijapur (1679–80) also failed. A new element which was brought into play was the Karnataki foot-soldiers — thirty thousand of them sent by the Berad chief, Pem Naik — were a major factor in withstanding the Mughal siege of Bijapur. Shivaji too sent a large force to relieve Bijapur and raided the Mughal dominions in all directions. Diler Khan could achieve nothing except laying Mughal territories open to Maratha raids and was recalled by Aurangzeb.

Phase 3 (1681–87): Direct Confrontation and Conquest of Bijapur and Golconda

When Aurangzeb reached the Deccan in 1681 in pursuit of his rebel son, prince Akbar, he concentrated his forces against Sambhaji (the son and successor of Shivaji) while making renewed efforts to detach Bijapur and Golconda from the side of the Marathas. His efforts did not have an outcome different from that of the earlier efforts. The Marathas were the only shield against the Mughals, and the Deccani states were not prepared to throw it away.

Aurangzeb now decided to force the issue. He called upon the Adil Shah as a vassal to supply provisions to the imperial army, allow Mughal armies free passage through his territory, and supply a contingent of 5000 to 6000 cavalry for the war against the Marathas. He also demanded that Sharza Khan, the leading Bijapuri noble opposed to the Mughals, be expelled. An open rupture was now inevitable. The Adil Shah appealed for help to both Golconda and Sambhaji — which was promptly given. However, even the combined forces of the Deccani states could not withstand the full strength of the Mughal army, particularly when commanded by the Mughal emperor or an energetic prince. It took 18 months of siege, with Aurangzeb being personally present during the final stages, before Bijapur fell (1686).

A campaign against Golconda was inevitable following the downfall of Bijapur. The "sins" of the Qutb Shah were too many to be pardoned. He had given supreme power to the infidels, Madanna and Akhanna, and helped Shivaji on various occasions. His latest "treachery" was sending 40,000 men to aid Bijapur despite Aurangzeb's warnings. In 1685, despite stiff resistance, the Mughals had occupied Golconda. The emperor agreed to pardon the Qutb Shah in return for a huge subsidy, the ceding of some areas, and the ousting of Madanna and Akhanna. The Qutb Shah agreed — Madanna and Akhanna were dragged out into the streets and murdered (1686). But even this crime failed to save the Qutb Shahi monarchy. After the fall of Bijapur, Aurangzeb decided to settle scores with the Qutb Shah. The siege opened early in 1687, and after more than six months, the fort fell on account of treachery and bribery. Golconda fell (1687).

Aurangzeb had triumphed but he soon found that the extinction of Bijapur and Golconda was only the beginning of his difficulties. The last and the most difficult phase of Aurangzeb's life began now.

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After the downfall of Bijapur and Golconda, Aurangzeb was able to concentrate all his forces against the Marathas. Apart from raiding Burhanpur and Aurangabad, the new Maratha king, Sambhaji, had thrown a challenge to Aurangzeb by giving shelter to his rebel son, prince Akbar. Aurangzeb was mortally afraid that a sally by prince Akbar into Mughal territories, backed up by the Marathas, might lead to a protracted civil war. However, Sambhaji took a peculiarly passive attitude towards prince Akbar, spending his energies in a futile war with the Sidis on the coast and with the Portuguese.

In 1689, Sambhaji was surprised at his secret hideout at Sangameshwar by a Mughal force. He was paraded before Aurangzeb and executed as a rebel and an infidel. This was undoubtedly another major political mistake on the part of Aurangzeb. He could have set a seal on his conquest of Bijapur and Golconda by coming to terms with the Marathas. By executing Sambhaji, he not only threw away this chance, but provided the Marathas a cause. In the absence of a single rallying point, the Maratha sardars were left free to plunder the Mughal territories, disappearing at the approach of the Mughal forces. Instead of destroying the Marathas, Aurangzeb made the Maratha opposition all-pervasive in the Deccan.

Rajaram, the younger brother of Sambhaji, was crowned as king, but had to escape when the Mughals attacked his capital. Rajaram sought shelter at Jinji on the east coast and continued the fight against the Mughals from there. Thus Maratha resistance spread from the west to the east coast.

However, for the moment, Aurangzeb was at the height of his power, having triumphed over all his enemies. Between 1690 and 1703, Aurangzeb stubbornly refused to negotiate with the Marathas. Rajaram was besieged at Jinji, but the siege proved to be long drawn out. Jinji fell in 1698, but the chief prize, Rajaram, escaped. Maratha resistance grew and the Mughals suffered a number of serious reverses. The Marathas recaptured many of their forts and Rajaram was able to come back to Satara.

Undaunted, Aurangzeb set out to win back all the Maratha forts. For five and a half years, from 1700 to 1705, Aurangzeb dragged his weary and ailing body from the siege of one fort to another. Floods, disease, and the Maratha roving bands took fearful toll of the Mughal army. Weariness and disaffection steadily grew among the nobles and the army. Demoralisation set in and many jagirdars made secret pacts with the Marathas and agreed to pay chauth if the Marathas did not disturb their jagirs.

In 1703, Aurangzeb opened negotiations with the Marathas. He was prepared to release Shahu, the son of Sambhaji, who had been captured at Satara along with his mother. Shahu had been treated well — given the title of raja and the mansab of 7000/7000. Aurangzeb was prepared to grant Shahu Shivaji's swarajya and the right of sardeshmukhi over the Deccan. Over 70 Maratha sardars actually assembled to receive Shahu. But Aurangzeb cancelled the arrangements at the last minute, uncertain about the intentions of the Marathas.

By 1706, Aurangzeb was convinced of the futility of his effort to capture all the Maratha forts. He slowly retreated to Aurangabad while an exulting Maratha army hovered around and attacked the stragglers. When Aurangzeb breathed his last at Aurangabad in 1707, he left behind an empire which was sorely distracted and in which all the various internal problems of the empire were coming to a head.

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Responsibility of Aurangzeb

In the political field, Aurangzeb committed a number of serious mistakes:

1. Inability to understand the true nature of the Maratha movement — his disregard of Jai Singh's advice to befriend Shivaji was a critical early error.
2. The execution of Sambhaji — deprived Aurangzeb of a recognised Maratha head to negotiate with, and provided the Marathas a cause.
3. The Maratha policy failure — he was convinced that after the extinction of Bijapur and Golconda, he had the Marathas at his mercy and that the Marathas had no option but to accept his terms — a truncated swarajya and promise of loyalty and service to the emperor.
4. Failure to unite the Deccani states against the Marathas — a unity of hearts between Aurangzeb and the Deccani states was "a psychological impossibility" once the treaty of 1636 was abandoned.
5. The breach with the Rajputs was a miscalculation — he wanted to divide Marwar between two claimants but in the process alienated both, and also the ruler of Mewar who considered Mughal interference in such matters a dangerous precedent.

Structural and Institutional Causes

The decline of the Mughal Empire was due to economic, social, political and institutional factors that transcended Aurangzeb's personal mistakes.

Jagirdari Crisis: The number of mansabdars rose from 2069 at the time of Jahangir's accession (1605), to 8000 in 1637 during Shah Jahan's reign, and to 11,456 during the latter half of Aurangzeb's reign. While the number of nobles rose five times, the revenue resources of the empire did not increase in the same proportion. Shah Jahan inaugurated what may be called an age of magnificence — the opulence of the nobles who already enjoyed the highest salaries in the world increased further during the period. The nobles tried to increase their income from land, squeezing the peasants and the zamindars. Attempts to realise more from the jagirs, often by means not sanctioned by the state, brought to the surface all the internal contradictions of medieval rural society. It led to peasant discontent in some areas, uprisings led by zamindars in some others, and attempts to carve out independent local kingdoms in still others.

Agrarian Decline: No new methods of cultivation were available to counter the trend of declining production as the soil became exhausted. The land revenue was heavy — from Akbar's time it was more or less half of the produce (including the share due to the zamindars and to the other local elements). The basic reasons for limiting expansion appear to have been social and partly administrative.

The Zamindars: Mughal policy towards the zamindars was contradictory. While the zamindars were considered the main threat to the internal stability of the empire, on the other hand, efforts were made to draw them into the task of local administration. The zamindars who had become more powerful and influential were in no mood to submit to the illegal exactions of the nobles. The movement of migrant peasants (pahis or uparis) from village to village in search of better conditions is a little noticed but significant feature of medieval rural life.

The Nobility: The nobility was the most important institution which developed under the Mughals. The Mughals were able to attract to their services some of the most competent people irrespective of race or creed. But the role the nobility played only served their own interests — it is wrong to argue (as some historians have done) that the nobility decayed because the "vivifying" stream of immigrants from Central Asia stopped after Aurangzeb's death. By the time Aurangzeb ascended the throne, the bulk of the Mughal nobility consisted of those who had been born in India. The belief that there was something wrong in the Indian climate which led to the decline of character was really a racialist argument put forward by British historians to justify India's domination by people coming from colder climates, and can no longer be accepted.

It has also been argued that the Mughal nobility acted in an anti-national manner because it was drawn from diverse communities and lacked a national character. A sense of nationalism as we understand the term today did not exist in medieval times. But the concept of loyalty to the salt was effective enough to ensure loyalty to the Mughal dynasty and a broad sense of patriotism. The nobles who came from abroad had few links left with the country of their origin and shared the Indo-Mughal cultural values and outlook.

The Mughals had devised a careful system of checks and balances at various levels in the administrative machinery. Nobles began to assume independent airs only when the administrative machinery was allowed to decay by the successors of Aurangzeb. Disintegration was speeded up not because of but as a result of the breakdown of the Mughal administrative system.

The Deccan Wars: The Deccan wars stretched Mughal lines of communications, made them vulnerable to Maratha attacks, and neglected the task of providing sound administration to the settled areas of Bijapur and Golconda. Aurangzeb bit off more than he could chew. In northern India, however, the Mughal administration still retained much of its vigour.

Final Assessment

Aurangzeb's religious policy should be seen in the social, economic, and political context. By itself, religion was not a point at issue. Jizyah was scrapped within half a dozen years of Aurangzeb's death and restrictions on building new temples eased. But these had no effect on the rapidly accelerating decline and disintegration of the empire.

In the ultimate resort, the decline and downfall of the empire was due to economic, social, political, and institutional factors. Akbar's measures helped to keep the forces of disintegration in check for some time. But it was impossible for him to effect fundamental changes in the structure of society. By the time Aurangzeb came to the throne, the socio-economic forces of disintegration were already strong. Aurangzeb lacked the foresight and statesmanship necessary to effect fundamental changes in the structure or to pursue policies which could, for the time being, reconcile the various competing elements.

Thus Aurangzeb was both a victim of circumstances and helped to create the circumstances of which he became a victim.

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• GS Paper I — Medieval History: Rise of Marathas, Shivaji's administration, Aurangzeb's Deccan policy, and causes of Mughal decline are perennially tested.
• Governance and Administration: Shivaji's Ashtapradhan, cash salary system, dual control of forts (three officers), and revenue assessment (Annaji Datto, 1679) are excellent examples of state-building.
• Continuity vs Change: The jagirdari crisis shows how a functional Akbari system became dysfunctional under the weight of expanding nobility without commensurate revenue growth.
• Agrarian History: The peasant-zamindar contradictions, the movement of pahis/uparis, the zamindars' growing defiance — all connect to questions on medieval agrarian society.
• Historiography: The 'racialism' of British historians (Indian climate/character decline thesis) vs. modern structural analysis — a direct UPSC historiography question angle.
• Interlinks: Shivaji ↔ Maratha National Sentiment | Jagirdari Crisis ↔ Mughal Decline | Aurangzeb's Deccan Policy ↔ Revenue Drain | Afghan Uprising ↔ Shivaji's consolidation

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1. Shivaji's early forts (1645–47) vs. conquest career (1656+): Shivaji overran Rajgarh, Kondana, and Torna at age 18 (1645–47). His real CAREER OF CONQUEST began in 1656 with the conquest of Javli from Chandra Rao More. Do not merge the two.
2. Afzal Khan killed in 1659, not 1657: The Mughal invasion of Bijapur was 1657 (which saved Shivaji from Bijapuri reprisal). Afzal Khan was murdered in 1659. Do not confuse these dates.
3. Treaty of Purandar — mansab to Sambhaji not Shivaji: The mansab of 5000 was granted to Shivaji's minor son Sambhaji in Shivaji's place (since Shivaji asked to be excused from personal service). Do not say the mansab was given to Shivaji.
4. Jai Singh's advice — often misread: Jai Singh's famous line "We shall hem Shiva in like the centre of a circle" was about using Shivaji as an ALLY to conquer Bijapur, NOT about isolating or destroying Shivaji. The fatal flaw was Aurangzeb's refusal to support this alliance.
5. Shivaji's coronation year: 1674 (at Rajgarh). The Karnataka expedition was 1676. Shivaji died in 1680.
6. Chauth vs Sardeshmukhi: Chauth = 25% (one-fourth) of land revenue of neighbouring territories. Sardeshmukhi = 10% additional. Chauth was a contribution; Sardeshmukhi was claimed as a hereditary right as chief zamindar of Maharashtra.
7. Gaga Bhatt: The priest who declared Shivaji a high class kshatriya at the coronation (1674) — not the same as any administrative official. Often appears in MCQs.
8. Annaji Datto (1679): Completed the new revenue assessment for Shivaji — NOT Malik Ambar. The revenue system was PATTERNED on Malik Ambar's system, but the actual new assessment was by Annaji Datto.
9. Bijapur fell 1686; Golconda fell 1687: In that order. Both fell due to treachery and bribery in the final stages.
10. Sambhaji executed 1689 — NOT 1687. He was captured at Sangameshwar, paraded before Aurangzeb, and executed. His execution was a POLITICAL MISTAKE — it gave Marathas a cause and left no single recognised head for Aurangzeb to negotiate with.

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• Shahji: Treaty of 1636 with Mughals; left Poona jagir to Jija Bai and Shivaji; joined Bijapur
• Shivaji at 18 (1645–47): Rajgarh, Kondana, Torna
• 1656: Javli conquest from Chandra Rao More — real career of conquest begins
• 1657: Mughal invasion of Bijapur saved Shivaji; he entered negotiations with Aurangzeb then changed sides
• 1659: Afzal Khan murdered — leaderless Bijapuri army routed
• 1660: Shaista Khan occupied Poona; 1663: Shivaji attacked Shaista Khan's harem, wounding him
• 1664: Shivaji looted Surat (first time); 1665: Treaty of Purandar (Jai Singh) — 23 forts surrendered
• Purandar terms: 23 of 35 forts surrendered (4 lakh huns revenue); 12 forts kept (1 lakh huns); 40 lakhs huns to be paid; mansab 5000 to Sambhaji
• 1666: Shivaji visited Agra, put in mansab of 5000 category (son's rank), escaped from detention
• 1670: Shivaji sacked Surat second time; recovered forts including Purandar
• 1674: Shivaji crowned at Rajgarh; Gaga Bhatt declared him kshatriya
• 1676: Karnataka expedition; alliance with Qutb Shah (1 lakh huns annual subsidy)
• 1680: Shivaji died
• Ashtapradhan: 8 ministers; Peshwa most important; not a council — each directly responsible to ruler
• Army: 30,000–40,000 regular cavalry (paga) + silahdars (loose); cash salaries preferred
• Chauth = 25% of land revenue of neighbours; Sardeshmukhi = 10% additional
• Three phases of Aurangzeb's Deccan policy: Phase 1 (1658–68), Phase 2 (1668–81), Phase 3 (1681–87)
• Phase 2 key: Madanna and Akhanna virtually ruled Golconda 1672–1687; tripartite alliance (Golconda-Bijapur-Shivaji)
• High watermark of Hyderabadi influence over Bijapur: Sidi Masud as regent
• Bijapur fell 1686 (18 months siege); Golconda fell 1687 (treachery and bribery)
• Sambhaji executed 1689 (Sangameshwar capture) = major political mistake
• Rajaram at Jinji; Jinji fell 1698; Rajaram escaped back to Satara
• 1700–1705: Aurangzeb dragging ailing body fort to fort; jagirdars making secret pacts; paying chauth
• 1703: Negotiations with Marathas; Shahu (son of Sambhaji, mansab 7000/7000) was to be released; cancelled at last minute