Mughal India in the First Half of the Seventeenth Century

The first half of the seventeenth century was broadly an era of progress and growth for the Mughal Empire. Two capable rulers — Jahangir (1605–1627) and Shah Jahan (1628–1658) — consolidated the administrative system inherited from Akbar. The Mughals maintained their alliance with the Rajputs and sought to broaden their political base by incorporating Afghans and Marathas. However, beneath the surface stability lay structural tensions: prosperity did not percolate down to peasants and workers, and the question of succession repeatedly threatened political stability.

In southern India, Bijapur and Golconda maintained internal peace and cultural growth. The Mughals also actively managed relations with neighbouring Asian powers — Iran (Safavids), the Uzbeks, and the Ottoman Turks — both for strategic security and trade expansion.

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Khusrau's Rebellion

Jahangir's eldest son Khusrau rebelled shortly after his accession. Jahangir decisively defeated him near Lahore and imprisoned him. The rebellion reflected the recurring Mughal problem of sons challenging fathers — a pattern begun by Jahangir himself.

Bengal and the Afghan Problem

Akbar had broken Afghan power in the east, but Afghan chiefs in Bengal retained strength with support from local Hindu rajas. Jahangir sent Islam Khan (grandson of Shaikh Salim Chishti) to Bengal in 1608. Islam Khan won over zamindars, shifted the provincial capital from Rajmahal to Dacca, and conquered Sonargaon and the Barah Bhuiyan. After Usman Khan's defeat, Afghan resistance collapsed and Mughal power was firmly established in east Bengal.

Malik Ambar and the Deccan

Malik Ambar of Ahmadnagar refused to accept Akbar's settlement and continued to resist. By 1622, Jahangir brought him to heel. However, the Persian conquest of Qandhar in 1622 and Jahangir's deteriorating health complicated matters.

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Nur Jahan (born Mehr-un-Nissa) had an Iranian origin. Her first husband Sher Afghan died in a clash with the Mughal governor of Bengal. She came to Agra, and in 1611 married Jahangir. Her family rose rapidly:

• Her father Itimaduddaula was made joint diwan.
• Her brother Asaf Khan was made khan-i-saman.
• Asaf Khan's daughter married Khurram (Shah Jahan), Jahangir's favourite son.

Modern historians debate her actual political power. Some argue that she, along with her father and brother in alliance with Khurram, formed a "junta" that effectively managed Jahangir, allowing no one to advance without their backing. This caused a factional division of the court. Others point out that till 1622, Jahangir himself took all major political decisions, as confirmed by his autobiography. What is not in dispute is that she dominated the royal household, shaped Persian cultural fashions at court, and was Jahangir's constant companion — a skilled rider and sure shot.

The Break with Shah Jahan

Nur Jahan's political ambitions eventually led to a breach with Shah Jahan. He rebelled in 1622, believing Jahangir was completely under her influence and fearing intrigues during his absence on campaign. The immediate trigger was his refusal to go to Qandhar. He put forward impossible demands — full command of the Deccan army, sway over Punjab, control of important forts. After years of conflict, Shah Jahan submitted in 1626; his sons Dara and Aurangzeb were sent to court as hostages.

Mahabat Khan's Episode

Mahabat Khan, feeling marginalised despite his role in suppressing Shah Jahan's rebellion, was summoned to court. When the royal camp was crossing the Jhelum, he seized Jahangir with a trusted body of Rajputs. Nur Jahan, who had escaped, tried unsuccessfully to free the emperor. She then surrendered herself to be close to Jahangir, outmanoeuvring Mahabat Khan diplomatically within six months. He abandoned Jahangir and eventually joined Shah Jahan. Nur Jahan's victory over Mahabat Khan showcased her cool courage and political acumen.

Jahangir died in 1627. Asaf Khan placed a puppet on the throne and recalled Shah Jahan. After Shah Jahan's accession, all rivals including Shahriyar were eliminated. Nur Jahan lived in retirement till her death 18 years later.

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The Three Rival Powers: Uzbeks, Safavids, Ottomans

After the collapse of the Timurid empire in the late 15th century, three powers dominated West and Central Asia:

• Uzbeks: Natural enemies of the Mughals (responsible for Babur's expulsion from Samarqand); Sunni; frequently clashed with Safavids over Khorasan.
• Safavids (Iran): Shia; crucial ally against the Uzbek threat; claimed Khorasan.
• Ottomans: Sunni; received the title Padshah-i-Islam; claimed Caliphate succession; enemy of Iran.

The Mughals refused to join any tripartite alliance against Iran as it would upset the Asian balance of power. Their alliance with Shia Iran annoyed Uzbeks, who occasionally stirred up Sunni fanaticism along the NW frontier between Peshawar and Kabul.

Akbar and the Uzbeks

In 1572–73, Abdullah Khan Uzbek seized Balkh and Badakhshan — a buffer between Mughals and Uzbeks. He proposed partitioning Iran with Akbar after Shah Tahmasp's death (1576), urging Akbar to jointly free Iraq, Khorasan, and Fars from the Shias. Akbar rejected sectarian appeals. His actual goal: a defensible scientific frontier based on the Hindukush.

Akbar's 1595 conquest of Qandhar, combined with Kabul (annexed 1585), completed this frontier: the Kabul-Ghazni-Qandhar line. Hindukush was defined as the boundary between Mughals and Uzbeks in an informal agreement. After Abdullah Khan Uzbek's death in 1598, the Uzbeks broke into warring principalities and ceased to be a major threat for decades.

The Question of Qandhar

Qandhar was the most contested issue in Mughal-Persian relations.

Strategic importance for Mughals:

• Vital for defence of Kabul; the fort was among the strongest in the region.
• Hub of trade between India and Central Asia (route: Central Asia → Multan via Qandhar → sea).
• Control over Afghan and Baluch tribes.
• One modern writer called the Kabul-Ghazni-Qandhar line "a strategic and logical frontier; beyond Kabul and Khaibar, there was no natural line of defence."

Contested history:

• Babur held Qandhar briefly in 1507; Safavids claimed it after defeating Shaibani Khan.
• For the next 1.5 decades it remained with semi-independent governors.
• Humayun ceded it to Shah Tahmasp (Persian king) in exchange for help against Kamran, but later retained it.
• Shah Tahmasp took Qandhar after Humayun's death (1556); Akbar reconquered it in 1595.

Jahangir's period: Shah Abbas I (1588–1629) maintained good relations with Jahangir despite the dispute. In 1620, Shah Abbas sent a polite request for Qandhar. Jahangir was taken by surprise. Hasty preparations were made but Qandhar fell to Persia in 1622 — the same year as Shah Jahan's rebellion, which distracted the empire.

Shah Jahan's attempts: Shah Jahan made three attempts to retake Qandhar after Persia reconquered it in 1649:

1. Aurangzeb (1st attempt) — defeated Persians outside the fort but could not take it.
2. Aurangzeb (2nd attempt, three years later) — also failed.
3. Dara (1653) — most grandiloquent effort; failed despite the two biggest guns in the empire.

The failure reflected the strength of the fort under a determined defender, not just Mughal weakness.

Shah Jahan's Balkh Campaign (1646–1647)

Shah Jahan accepted an appeal from Nazr Muhammad, the Uzbek ruler of Balkh and Badakhshan, against his son Abdul Aziz. An army of 50,000 horse and 10,000 foot under Prince Murad left Kabul in mid-1646. Murad's impetuosity disrupted diplomatic plans. The Mughals were forced to hold Balkh against a hostile population and Uzbek tribes that Abdul Aziz had rallied (120,000 men across the Oxus). Despite routing Uzbeks outside Balkh in 1647, the Mughals retreated in October 1647 — winter was approaching and supplies had run out. The retreat nearly became a rout; Aurangzeb's firmness saved the army.

Assessment: The campaign was a military success but a political failure. Balkh was strategically and politically impossible to hold. Shah Jahan's real objective was a friendly buffer ruler in Balkh-Badakhshan. Nazr Muhammad, who had taken refuge in Persia, remained friendly to the Mughals till his death.

Summary of Mughal Foreign Policy Principles

1. Defence of the scientific frontier (Hindukush-Qandhar line) as the overarching goal.
2. Equality in relations with all Asian powers — refusing subordination to Safavid religious claims or Ottoman Caliphate claims.
3. Promotion of India's commercial interests through Kabul and Qandhar as twin gateways to Central Asian trade.
4. Friendship with Iran as the keynote, despite Qandhar tensions — because Iran was the best bulwark against Uzbek and Ottoman threats.

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Origins and Structure

The mansabdari system, initiated by Akbar around the 19th year of his reign (1577), was a unique system with no exact parallel outside India. Its origins can be traced to Changez Khan's decimal army organisation (toman = 10,000). The Delhi Sultanate had sadis and hazaras (commanders of 100 and 1000).

The system had two ranks:

• Zat rank: Personal status in the imperial hierarchy; fixed salary.
• Sawar rank: Number of cavalrymen a mansabdar was expected to maintain for the state.

There were 66 grades of mansabs from 10 to 10,000. Ranks above 5,000 were reserved for princes.

• Below 500 zat = mansabdar
• 500–2499 zat = amir
• 2500+ zat = amir-i-umda or amir-i-azam

Salary and Jagir System

Salaries were stated in rupees but paid by assignment of jagirs (revenue-yielding territories). Actual cash payment was rare. The revenue register (jama-dami) assessed income in dams (40 dams = 1 rupee). The mansabdari system was thus linked to the jagirdari system.

A mansabdar of 5,000 zat received ~Rs. 30,000/month; one of 3,000 ~Rs. 17,000/month; one of 1,000 ~Rs. 8,200/month. About a quarter of salaries went to the transport corps.

The Sawar System and Changes after Akbar

Du-aspah sih-aspah system (introduced by Jahangir): Selected nobles could maintain larger troop quotas without a raise in zat rank. A mansabdar with du-aspah sih-aspah (literally: 2 or 3 horses) had to maintain and was paid for double the troopers indicated by his sawar rank.

Month-scale (masahra): Since the number of mansabdars kept growing and salaries could not be cut drastically, salaries were put on a month-scale — 10 months, 8 months, 6 months or less — with contingent obligations reduced accordingly.

Reduction in sawar obligations (Shah Jahan's period): Nobles were required to maintain only 1/3 to 1/5 of their sawar rank in actual troopers. This drastically reduced the effective cavalry force and adversely affected Mughal military efficiency.

Mixed contingents: The Mughals favoured contingents with fixed proportions of Irani and Turani Mughals, Indian Muslims, Afghans, and Rajputs to prevent tribal/ethnic exclusiveness.

Mughal Army Composition

• Cavalry (mansabdars, ahadis): Principal arm. Ahadis were gentlemen-troopers, directly recruited by emperors, trusted corps.
• Infantry (piyadgan): Largely ill-organised; included banduqchi (matchlock bearers), but also porters, servants, swordsmen, news-runners, even slaves.
• Artillery: Two sections — heavy guns (clumsy, for siege) and light artillery (highly mobile). Mughals employed Ottoman and Portuguese gunners initially. Frenchman Bernier praised the light "artillery of the stirrup" under Shah Jahan.
• War elephants and royal bodyguards (wala-shuhis).

Strength: About 200,000 cavalry under Shah Jahan (excluding district forces), rising to 240,000 under Aurangzeb. Infantry (excluding non-fighters) ~40,000.

Major weakness: The Mughal army's major weakness was in naval power and sea-warfare. It was not inferior to Central Asian and Persian armies in open combat but could not match European sea-going powers.

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• GS Paper I — Medieval History: The Mughal administrative system (mansabdari, jagirdari) is a standard exam topic. Understanding its evolution from Akbar to Shah Jahan reveals the trajectory of Mughal decline.
• Continuity vs Change: The mansabdari system shows how a functional Akbari institution was gradually hollowed out through month-scale reductions and sawar dilution — foreshadowing Aurangzeb's crisis.
• Nationalism and Colonialism linkage: Mughal foreign policy prevented significant foreign invasion for over a century, creating conditions under which trade and culture flourished — a context the British later disrupted fundamentally.
• Gender in History: Nur Jahan's case is a rare instance in medieval Indian history of documented female political participation at the highest level; relevant to questions on women in history.
• Administrative History: The link between the mansabdari system and the jagirdari system is key to understanding land revenue, agrarian crisis, and ultimately Mughal decline.
• Interlinks: Mansabdari System ↔ Mughal Decline | Qandhar Dispute ↔ Mughal-Persian Relations | Balkh Campaign ↔ Mughal Military Overreach | Nur Jahan ↔ Mughal Court Politics

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1. Jahangir vs Shah Jahan chronology on Qandhar: Qandhar fell to Persia in 1622 (during Jahangir's reign, while Shah Jahan was in rebellion). Shah Jahan's reconquest attempt came after 1649. Do not conflate the two.
2. Nur Jahan's role — overstated vs understated: UPSC questions may test whether Jahangir was dominated by Nur Jahan. Historians are divided. The nuanced answer: her influence was real but Jahangir retained decision-making till 1622 (autobiography evidence).
3. Mansab ranks confusion: Mansabdar (below 500), Amir (500–2499), Amir-i-Umda/Amir-i-Azam (2500+). Do NOT confuse zat and sawar ranks — they serve different purposes.
4. Du-aspah sih-aspah: This was introduced by Jahangir, not Akbar or Shah Jahan. It doubled/tripled sawar obligations without raising zat rank.
5. Balkh campaign vs Qandhar campaign: Balkh (1646–47) was against Uzbeks and was a temporary military success. Qandhar campaigns (1649, 1652, 1653) were against Persians and all failed. Do not mix up the two.
6. Abdullah Khan Uzbek's embassy to Akbar (1577): He proposed partitioning Iran — not a joint attack on Mughals. Akbar rejected the anti-Shia framing.
7. Islam Khan vs Man Singh in Bengal: Man Singh was recalled; Islam Khan (not Man Singh) was the one who consolidated Mughal power and shifted the capital to Dacca.
8. Mahabat Khan — not a Nur Jahan loyalist: He was initially used against Shah Jahan but later fell out with the court. He eventually joined Shah Jahan — the very prince whose rebellion he had helped suppress.
9. Khusrau killed by Shah Jahan, not Jahangir: Shah Jahan killed Khusrau in 1621 — a fact often confused.
10. Month-scale system: Introduced to manage financial pressures when mansabdar numbers grew; it reduced obligations without cutting nominal ranks — a systemic compromise that weakened actual military strength.

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• Jahangir: 1605–1627; Shah Jahan: 1628–1658
• Khusrau rebellion → defeated near Lahore; Khusrau killed by Shah Jahan in 1621
• Islam Khan subdued Bengal (1608+); capital shifted Rajmahal → Dacca
• Nur Jahan married Jahangir in 1611; brother Asaf Khan = khan-i-saman; father Itimaduddaula = joint diwan
• Nur Jahan "junta" debate — Jahangir was likely autonomous till 1622
• Shah Jahan's rebellion (1622) triggered by Qandhar crisis + Nur Jahan's influence
• Mahabat Khan seized Jahangir at River Jhelum (1626); Nur Jahan outmanoeuvred him within 6 months
• Qandhar: strategic hub; claimed by both Mughals and Persians; fell to Persia in 1622, regained 1638 (Ali Mardan Khan defected), lost again 1649
• Three failed campaigns to retake Qandhar after 1649 (Aurangzeb x2, Dara x1)
• Balkh campaign (1646–47): military success, political failure; Murad replaced by Aurangzeb
• Uzbeks: enemies; Safavids: allies; Ottomans: Sunni but too far and claimed Caliphate
• Mansabdari system: Akbar initiated ~1577; zat (personal rank) + sawar (cavalry quota)
• 66 grades from 10 to 10,000; above 5000 reserved for princes
• Du-aspah sih-aspah: Jahangir's innovation; double/triple sawar quota
• Month-scale: reduced salary and obligations as mansabdar numbers grew
• Mughal army: cavalry dominant; infantry ill-organised; artillery improving; navy = weakest arm
• Ahadis = gentlemen-troopers directly under emperor; ~7000 under Shah Jahan
• Mughal foreign policy aims: scientific NW frontier, equality with Asian powers, promote trade