Polity · Constitutional Framework
A comprehensive study of the Directive Principles of State Policy (Part IV, Articles 36–51) — their origin, features, classification into socialistic, Gandhian and liberal-intellectual categories, constitutional amendments, the landmark conflict with Fundamental Rights, judicial evolution, and their practical implementation since 1950.
The Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP) occupy Part IV of the Constitution, spanning Articles 36 to 51. Article 36 defines 'State' for the purpose of Part IV — identical in scope to the definition in Part III (Fundamental Rights) — covering the legislative and executive organs of both Union and state governments, all local authorities, and all other public authorities across India. Article 37 states that although the Directive Principles are non-justiciable, they are fundamental to the governance of the country and it is the duty of the State to apply them in making laws.
Origin: The framers drew inspiration from the Irish Constitution of 1937, which had itself adapted the concept from the Spanish Constitution. Dr B R Ambedkar regarded the Directive Principles as 'novel features' of the Indian Constitution. Granville Austin famously described both the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles together as the 'Conscience of the Constitution', since they jointly embody its philosophical core.
Ideals for State Action: The DPSPs function as constitutional instructions or recommendations to the State regarding legislative, executive, and administrative conduct. They represent the ideals the State must keep in view while framing policies and enacting laws.
Resemblance to Instrument of Instructions: Dr Ambedkar noted that the DPSPs closely resemble the 'Instrument of Instructions' issued to the Governor-General and provincial Governors under the Government of India Act, 1935. The key distinction is that while those instruments were directed at executive heads, the DPSPs are addressed to the legislature and the executive alike.
Comprehensive Welfare Programme: Taken together, the DPSPs constitute a far-reaching economic, social, and political programme for a modern democratic State. They aspire to realise the values of justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity proclaimed in the Preamble. They articulate the vision of a 'welfare state' — in sharp contrast to the 'police state' of the colonial era, which was preoccupied only with law and order and external defence.
Non-Justiciable Character: Unlike Fundamental Rights, DPSPs cannot be enforced through courts. No government — Union, state or local — can be legally compelled to implement them. However, this does not make them politically or morally irrelevant.
Aid to Judicial Review: Even though non-justiciable, DPSPs assist courts in assessing the constitutional validity of legislation. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that if a law seeks to give effect to a Directive Principle, courts may treat it as 'reasonable' under Article 14 (equality) or Article 19 (six freedoms), thereby saving it from being struck down.
The Constitution does not formally classify the DPSPs. However, based on content and underlying ideology, they are conventionally grouped into three categories:
These reflect socialist ideology and aim at social and economic justice, forming the backbone of the welfare state vision.
These principles embody Mahatma Gandhi's vision of a reconstructed, self-reliant Indian society, rooted in village republics, cottage industries, and social uplift.
These reflect liberal constitutionalism and international commitments.
| Amendment | Year | Additions |
|---|---|---|
| 42nd Amendment | 1976 | Articles 39(f), 39A, 43A, 48A |
| 44th Amendment | 1978 | Article 38 (minimise inequalities) |
| 86th Amendment | 2002 | Changed Article 45 (early childhood care up to 6 years) |
| 97th Amendment | 2011 | Article 43B (cooperative societies) |
The idea of dividing individual rights into justiciable and non-justiciable categories was recommended by Sir B N Rau, the Constitutional Advisor to the Constituent Assembly, and accepted by the Drafting Committee. This led to Part III (justiciable Fundamental Rights) and Part IV (non-justiciable DPSPs).
Though not court-enforceable, DPSPs carry two kinds of sanction:
Why non-justiciable? The framers adopted a pragmatic approach, recognising:
No Legal Force: K T Shah called them 'pious superfluities' — likening them to 'a cheque on a bank, payable only when resources permit'. Nasiruddin compared them to 'new year's resolutions, broken on the second of January'. T T Krishnamachari termed them a 'veritable dustbin of sentiments'; K C Wheare called them a 'manifesto of aims and aspirations' and a 'moral homily'; Sir Ivor Jennings dismissed them as 'pious aspirations'.
Illogical Arrangement: N Srinivasan criticised the DPSPs for mixing trivial issues with vital socio-economic questions, and for blending modern provisions with those based on sentiment. Sir Ivor Jennings also noted the absence of any consistent guiding philosophy.
Conservative Outlook: Sir Ivor Jennings remarked that the DPSPs reflect 19th-century English political philosophy, characterised by Fabian socialism without actual socialism. He warned they might become outdated for the 21st century.
Constitutional Conflict: K Santhanam warned that the DPSPs could trigger conflicts between the Centre and states, between the President and the Prime Minister, and between the Governor and the Chief Minister — especially when the Centre gives directions to states for DPSP implementation or when the President questions a bill passed by Parliament.
Despite criticisms, the DPSPs are not mere ornamental appendages. Their utility is widely acknowledged:
According to M C Setalvad (former Attorney General), DPSPs serve as:
They also:
| Basis | Fundamental Rights | Directive Principles |
|---|---|---|
| Nature | Negative — restrain the State | Positive — require the State to act |
| Enforceability | Justiciable — enforceable by courts | Non-justiciable — not enforceable by courts |
| Goal | Political democracy | Social and economic democracy |
| Sanction | Legal | Moral and political |
| Focus | Individual welfare | Community welfare |
| Legislation needed | No — self-executing | Yes — require legislation |
| Judicial consequence | Court can strike down violating law | Court cannot strike down; but can uphold a law enacted to give effect to DPSP |
The tension between justiciable Fundamental Rights and the moral obligation to implement non-justiciable DPSPs has generated one of the most consequential constitutional debates in India.
Champakam Dorairajan Case (1951): The Supreme Court held that in any conflict between Fundamental Rights and DPSPs, Fundamental Rights prevail. DPSPs must conform to and remain subsidiary to Fundamental Rights. However, the Court clarified that Parliament could amend Fundamental Rights via constitutional amendment. This prompted the 1st (1951), 4th (1955), and 17th (1964) Amendment Acts to implement certain DPSPs.
Golaknath Case (1967): The Supreme Court held that Fundamental Rights are 'sacrosanct' and Parliament cannot abridge or take them away even through constitutional amendment — including for DPSP implementation.
Parliament responded with:
Kesavananda Bharati Case (1973): The Supreme Court upheld the first provision of Article 31C as constitutional. However, it struck down the second provision as unconstitutional because judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution and cannot be removed.
42nd Amendment Act (1976): Extended the protection of Article 31C to cover laws implementing any Directive Principle — not just Articles 39(b) and (c) — thereby seeking to give DPSPs primacy over Articles 14, 19 and 31.
Minerva Mills Case (1980): The Supreme Court struck down this extension as unconstitutional. The balance between Fundamental Rights and DPSPs was declared an essential feature of the basic structure of the Constitution. The Court held: 'They are like two wheels of a chariot, one no less than the other. To give absolute primacy to one over the other is to disturb the harmony of the Constitution.'
Since 1950, both the Union and state governments have enacted laws and launched programmes to implement DPSPs:
Beyond Articles 36–51, three more non-justiciable Directives are found in other Parts of the Constitution:
Though located outside Part IV, these Directives carry equal importance; the judiciary insists that all parts of the Constitution must be read together.
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This chapter covers Introduction and Constitutional Position, Features of the Directive Principles, Classification of Directive Principles, Constitutional Amendments Adding New DPSPs, Sanction Behind Directive Principles. It is organized as revision-ready notes followed by a linked practice quiz.
For The State's Socio-Economic Conscience: Directive Principles and Their Non-Justiciable Vision, focus on definitions, dates, places, institutions, distinguishing features, and factual comparisons in the chapter. Then use the quiz to check recall and identify gaps.
Use the The State's Socio-Economic Conscience: Directive Principles and Their Non-Justiciable Vision chapter headings to organize an answer framework. Connect causes, consequences, comparisons, examples, and evidence wherever the notes provide them instead of memorizing isolated facts.