After the War: India's Political Landscape in the Final Decade of Colonial Rule

Post-War National Scenario

The end of World War II (August 1945) did not bring quietude to India — it unleashed a torrent of pent-up nationalist energy. Three years of brutal Quit India repression had not broken the people; if anything, it had deepened anti-British resolve. Simultaneously, the international balance of power had shifted decisively against colonial empires: Britain was economically shattered, USA and USSR had emerged as superpowers both opposed to colonialism, and a wave of anti-imperialist struggles was sweeping Southeast Asia. The stage was set for the final act — a period of tortuous negotiations between the Congress, the Muslim League and the departing British, set against a backdrop of communal violence, armed revolt, and the crystallisation of the two-nation theory into the reality of partition.

---

---

The last two years of British rule witnessed two simultaneous but distinct strands:

1. Tortuous negotiations between the government, Congress and Muslim League — increasingly accompanied by communal violence and culminating in freedom and partition.
2. Sporadic, localised but extremely militant and often united mass action by workers, peasants and states' peoples — taking the form of a countrywide strike wave. This included the INA Release Movement, Royal Indian Navy (RIN) revolt, Tebhaga movement, Worli revolt, Punjab Kisan Morchas, Travancore peoples' struggle (especially the Punnapra-Vayalar episode), and the Telangana peasant revolt.

---

When the ban on the Congress was lifted and leaders were released in June 1945, the British expected to find a demoralised people. Instead, they found tumultuous crowds impatient for action. The change in British attitude was driven by:

1. Shift in global power: UK was no longer a big power; USA and USSR — both favouring Indian freedom — had emerged as superpowers.
2. Labour government (July 1945, under Clement Attlee) was more sympathetic to Indian demands than Churchill's Conservatives.
3. Wave of socialist-radical governments across Europe.
4. War-weary British soldiers and shattered British economy — by 1945 the British government owed India £1.2 billion; the US Lend-Lease debt was only paid off in 2006.
5. Anti-imperialist wave in Southeast Asia — resistance to French and Dutch re-colonisation in Vietnam and Indonesia.
6. Fear of another Congress revolt — officials feared a repeat of 1942 but far more dangerous: a combination of attacks on communications, agrarian revolts, labour trouble, army disaffection joined by government officials and INA-trained men.
7. Inevitable elections since last elections were held in 1934 (Centre) and 1937 (provinces).

As Lord Wavell wrote in October 1946: "Our time in India is limited and our power to control events almost gone. We have only prestige and previous momentum to trade on and these will not last long."

---

Election Campaign

The Congress election campaign was not merely electoral — it was a nationalist mobilisation. Two main planks:

1. The repression of 1942: glorifying martyrs, condemning officials responsible for brutality, setting up martyrs' memorials, collecting relief funds.
2. Mass pressure against trial of INA POWs: the INA issue was framed as an 'India versus Britain' question.

The campaign devastated the morale of government services; officials feared the return of Congress ministries in provinces where repression had been most brutal.

INA Trials — A Strategic Blunder

The British decision to publicly try INA prisoners backfired spectacularly. They compounded the error by holding the first trial at the Red Fort in Delhi (November 1945) and placing in the dock together:

• Prem Kumar Sehgal (Hindu)
• Shah Nawaz Khan (Muslim)
• Gurbaksh Singh Dhillon (Sikh)

This trio symbolised cross-communal unity against British imperialism — the worst possible optics for Britain.

Congress support for INA prisoners:

• First post-war Congress session (Bombay, September 1945) adopted a strong pro-INA resolution
• Defence organised by: Bhulabhai Desai, Tej Bahadur Sapru, Kailash Nath Katju, Jawaharlal Nehru and Asaf Ali
• INA Relief and Enquiry Committee distributed funds and helped arrange employment

Why the INA Agitation was a Landmark

• Unprecedented scale: fund contributions came from film stars, municipal committees, tongawallas, gurudwaras, Indians abroad
• Geographic spread: nerve centres in Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, UP towns and Punjab; reached Coorg, Baluchistan and Assam
• INA Day: November 12, 1945; INA Week: November 5–11
• Broad political coalescence: Congress, Muslim League, Communist Party, Unionists, Akalis, Justice Party, Ahrars, RSS, Hindu Mahasabha and Sikh League — all supported the INA cause in varying degrees
• Penetrated traditional Raj loyalists: government employees, titled gentlemen, men of the armed forces

---

The nationalist sentiment around the INA trials erupted into three violent confrontations:

Upsurge 1: November 21, 1945 — Calcutta (INA Trials)

Student procession — Forward Bloc sympathisers, SFI activists, Islamia College students, League and Congress students marched to Dalhousie Square. Lathicharge → stone-throwing → police firing → 2 deaths.

Upsurge 2: February 11, 1946 — Calcutta (Rashid Ali Sentence)

Protest against the seven-year sentence given to INA officer Rashid Ali. Muslim League students led; Congress and Communist student groups joined. Arrests → defiance of Section 144 → lathicharge.

Upsurge 3: February 18, 1946 — Bombay (Royal Indian Navy Revolt)

1,100 ratings of HMIS Talwar went on strike protesting:

• Racial discrimination (unequal pay for Indians vs white soldiers)
• Unpalatable food and abuse by superior officers
• Arrest of a rating for writing 'Quit India' on HMIS Talwar
• INA trials
• Use of Indian troops in Indonesia

Ratings hoisted the tricolour, crescent, and hammer-and-sickle flags on the rebel fleet. They drove through Bombay in lorries with Congress flags. Crowds brought them food; shopkeepers invited them to take what they needed.

Patel and Jinnah persuaded the ratings to surrender on February 23 with assurances against victimisation.

Three-Stage Pattern (Common to All Three)

• Stage I: A group defies authority → repression → retaliation
• Stage II: City people join → virtual paralysis of Calcutta/Bombay — meetings, processions, hartals, attacks on Europeans, banks, trams, railways
• Stage III: Sympathetic action across India — strikes in military establishments in Karachi, Madras, Visakhapatnam, Calcutta, Delhi, Cochin, Jamnagar, Andamans, Bahrain and Aden; RIAF strikes in Bombay, Poona, Calcutta, Jessore and Ambala

Concessions Wrung by These Upsurges

• December 1, 1946: Only INA members accused of murder or brutal treatment to be tried
• January 1947: Imprisonment sentences of first batch remitted
• February 1947: Indian soldiers withdrawn from Indo-China and Indonesia
• November 1946: Decision to send a parliamentary delegation to India
• January 1946: Decision to send the Cabinet Mission

Limitations of the Three Upsurges

• Only militant sections could participate — inherently limited reach
• Short-lived; confined to a few urban centres
• Communal unity was more organisational than a unity among the people — Muslim ratings went to the League, others to Congress/Socialists
• British infrastructure of repression remained intact (a Maratha battalion rounded up the ratings)
• Congress did NOT officially support these upsurges — Gandhi called the mutiny "badly advised"

---

Congress Performance

• Won 91% of non-Muslim votes
• Won 57 out of 102 seats in the Central Assembly
• Majorities in most provinces: Madras, Bombay, UP, Bihar, Orissa, Central Provinces, NWFP and Assam (both claimed for Pakistan)
• Coalition partner (with Unionists and Akalis) in Punjab under Khizr Hayat Khan

Muslim League Performance

• Won 86.6% of Muslim votes
• Won all 30 reserved seats in Central Assembly
• Majorities in Bengal and Sindh
• Unlike 1937, clearly established as the dominant party among Muslims

Significance

Despite communal voting patterns (exacerbated by separate electorates and limited franchise — less than 10% voted for provinces; less than 1% for Centre), the results demonstrated both the Congress's all-India reach and the League's consolidation of Muslim support.

---

Why British Withdrawal Now Seemed Inevitable

1. Nationalism had penetrated hitherto untouched sections — including the bureaucracy and loyalist classes
2. The ICS was already at British-Indian parity by 1939; war weariness had depleted it further
3. British strategy of conciliation-and-repression had exhausted itself — after Cripps, nothing remained to offer short of full freedom
4. RIN revolt and Army's pro-INA sympathies made armed forces unreliable
5. Full official rule was impossible — insufficient numbers of efficient officials
6. B.R. Tomlinson observed: "The British Cabinet saw the growing rift between the Congress and the Muslim League as their trump card" — but this strategy too had run its course

Composition of the Cabinet Mission

• Pethick Lawrence (Secretary of State for India) — Chairman
• Stafford Cripps (President of the Board of Trade)
• A.V. Alexander (First Lord of Admiralty)

Arrived in Delhi: March 24, 1946

Cabinet Mission Plan — Main Points

Rejection of Pakistan — on five grounds:

1. Pakistan would contain a large non-Muslim population: 38% in North-West, 48% in North-East
2. The same principle of communal self-determination would require separation of Hindu-majority western Bengal and Sikh/Hindu-dominated Ambala and Jullundur divisions of Punjab
3. Deep-seated regional ties in Bengal and Punjab would be disturbed
4. Economic and administrative problems — particularly communication between West and East Pakistan
5. Division of the armed forces would be dangerous

Three-Section Grouping of Provincial Assemblies:

• Section A: Madras, Bombay, Central Provinces, UP, Bihar, Orissa (Hindu-majority)
• Section B: Punjab, NWFP, Sindh (Muslim-majority)
• Section C: Bengal and Assam (Muslim-majority)

Constitutional Structure:

• Three-tier executive and legislature at provincial, section, and union levels
• Constituent Assembly of 389 members: 292 from provincial assemblies + 4 from Chief Commissioner's provinces + 93 from princely states
• Members from groups A, B, C to first sit separately to decide provincial/group constitutions; then whole CA to formulate union constitution
• Common centre for defence, communication and external affairs only — federal structure
• Provinces to have full autonomy and residual powers
• Communal questions in central legislature decided by simple majority of BOTH communities
• Princely states: no longer under British paramountcy — free to make arrangements with successor governments
• After first general elections, a province could opt out of its group; after 10 years, could call for reconsideration of group or union constitution
• Meanwhile, an Interim Government to be formed

Interpretive Dispute: The Grouping Clause

• Congress: Grouping was optional; one CA was envisaged; League had no veto
• Muslim League: Pakistan was implied in compulsory grouping (Mission later clarified grouping was indeed compulsory — ruling in the League's favour)

Objections

Congress objected to:

• Provinces should have the option of NOT joining a group in the first place (had NWFP and Assam in mind — Congress-governed provinces placed in Groups B and C)
• Compulsory grouping contradicts provincial autonomy
• No elected members from princely states (only prince-nominated)

Muslim League objected to:

• Grouping should be explicitly compulsory with sections B and C developing into a solid Pakistan

Acceptance and the Unravelling

• June 6, 1946: Muslim League accepts long-term plan
• June 24, 1946: Congress accepts long-term plan
• July 1946: Elections to provincial assemblies for Constituent Assembly
• July 10, 1946: Nehru's press statement — "We are not bound by a single thing except that we have decided to go into the Constituent Assembly" — implying CA sovereignty and that grouping would likely not happen for NWFP and Assam
• July 29, 1946: League withdraws acceptance; calls for 'Direct Action' from August 16

---

From August 16, 1946 (Direct Action Day), unprecedented communal riots erupted. Worst-hit areas: Calcutta, Bombay, Noakhali, Bihar and Garhmukteshwar (UP).

Interim Government (September 2, 1946)

Fearing Congress mass action, Wavell invited a Congress-dominated Interim Government headed by Nehru (sworn in September 2, 1946). Key portfolios:

• Nehru: External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations (Vice President of Executive Council)
• Patel: Home, Information and Broadcasting
• Baldev Singh: Defence
• Rajendra Prasad: Agriculture and Food
• Jagjivan Ram: Labour
• Asaf Ali: Railways
• C. Rajagopalachari: Education

The League joined on October 26, 1946 — without withdrawing 'direct action', despite having rejected both plans of the Cabinet Mission. League portfolios:

• Liaqat Ali Khan: Finance (used to encumber other ministries)
• Jogendra Nath Mandal: Law

League's Obstructionist Strategy

• Did NOT attend the Constituent Assembly (first meeting: December 9, 1946 — Nehru's Objectives Resolution passed)
• Refused to attend informal cabinet meetings
• Questioned Congress appointments and decisions
• Liaqat Ali Khan as Finance Minister systematically restricted other ministries' functioning
• League's goal: use the foothold in government to fight for Pakistan — "a continuation of the civil war by other means"

February 1947: Nine Congress cabinet members wrote to the Viceroy demanding resignation of League members. League countered by demanding dissolution of the Constituent Assembly.

---

Nature of Communalism

Communalism evolved through three broad stages:

1. Communal Nationalism: Religious community membership means identical secular interests
2. Liberal Communalism: Different religious communities have different interests in secular sphere too
3. Extreme Communalism: Different communities' interests are incompatible — they cannot co-exist

Communalism is a modern phenomenon — not rooted in timeless religious conflict but in modern colonial political economy: competition for jobs, separate electorates, limited franchise, British divide-and-rule, and the rise of a middle class that propagated imaginary communal interests.

Socio-economic Roots

• A Bengali Muslim had more in common culturally with a Bengali Hindu than with a Punjabi Muslim
• Both Hindu and Muslim masses were equal victims of British imperialism
• Muslim intellectuals absorbed modern Western thought later; their proportion in education, trade and industry was lower
• This allowed reactionary landlords and richer classes to dominate Muslim masses
• Intense competition for scarce government jobs in a colonially underdeveloped economy created fertile ground for communal mobilisation
• Colonial government used concessions, favours, reservations and men like Syed Ahmed Khan to counter nationalist forces

British Policy of Divide and Rule

• After 1857, Muslims were treated with suspicion and repressed
• After 1870s, as Indian nationalism grew, British policy reversed — Muslims were courted through concessions to counter the Congress
• Syed Ahmed Khan — initially broadminded and reformist — was later used to urge Muslims to stay away from the Congress and seek separate interests
• The Shimla Delegation (1906) led by Agha Khan to Viceroy Minto secured the principle of separate electorates and over-representation — formalised in the Morley-Minto Reforms (1909)
• All India Muslim League founded (1906) by Agha Khan, Nawab Salimullah of Dacca, Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk and Nawab Waqar-ul-Mulk to preach loyalty to Britain and keep Muslim intelligentsia away from Congress

Evolution of the Two-Nation Theory — Key Milestones

Side-effects of Socio-religious Reforms and Militant Nationalism

• Wahabi Movement (Muslims) and Shuddhi (Hindus) with militant overtones made religion more vulnerable to communalisation
• Early nationalists consciously tried to avoid communal issues — Dadabhai Naoroji (Congress session 1886) pledged not to raise socio-religious questions; 1889 Congress decided not to take up issues opposed by Muslims
• But militant nationalism introduced Hindu tinge into nationalist politics: Tilak's Ganapati and Shivaji festivals, anti-cow slaughter campaigns, Swadeshi Movement's religious symbolism, revolutionary oath-taking before goddesses
• These alienated Muslim participation
• Communal historiography (British imperialist historians, later some Indian ones) portrayed ancient India as the 'Hindu phase' and medieval as the 'Muslim phase' — distorting political conflicts of ruling classes as Hindu-Muslim conflicts

Congress's Failures

By negotiating with the League, the Congress:

1. Gave legitimacy to communal politics
2. Undermined secular, nationalist Muslims
3. Concessions to one community prompted others to demand similar ones
4. Made an all-out attack on communalism impossible

---

• GS Paper I — Modern India: The INA trials, RIN revolt and three upsurges represent the final phase of mass anti-colonial mobilisation — connecting the Quit India Movement to independence through popular pressure rather than just elite negotiation.
• Communalism as a Modern Phenomenon: Directly relevant to GS I theme of communalism — its colonial roots, the role of separate electorates, and the middle-class competition for jobs must be understood as structurally produced, not primordially given.
• Constitutional History: Cabinet Mission Plan is the most sophisticated British constitutional proposal — more detailed than the August Offer or Cripps Mission. Its rejection is the direct precursor to the Mountbatten Plan and partition.
• Federalism and Centre-State Relations: The Cabinet Mission's three-tier structure with provincial residual powers prefigures debates on Indian federalism. The controversy over compulsory grouping is a direct ancestor of Article 370-style asymmetry debates.
• Institutional Design: The Constituent Assembly's composition (389 members; proportional representation; three groups) is frequently tested in GS II constitutional questions.
• Women and Labour: The RIN ratings' revolt, the Tebhaga movement and other mass actions show that independence was not just a Congress-elite project — working-class and armed forces pressure was structurally decisive.

---

• Labour vs Conservative: It was the Labour Party (Attlee) — not Churchill's Conservatives — that sent the Cabinet Mission and oversaw transfer of power. Churchill famously said he had not become PM to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire. Wavell Plan was under the Conservatives; Cabinet Mission was under Labour.
• Cabinet Mission composition: Pethick Lawrence was the chairman, not Cripps. Cripps was President of the Board of Trade. A.V. Alexander was First Lord of Admiralty. Confusing the chair with Cripps (who had his own earlier mission) is a classic error.
• Section assignments: Section A = Hindu-majority; Section B = Punjab, NWFP, Sindh; Section C = Bengal and Assam. Note: Assam is in Section C (Muslim-majority group) — this was the key Congress objection, since Assam had a Congress government.
• NWFP in Section B — also Congress-governed, also placed in the Muslim-majority group. Both NWFP (B) and Assam (C) were Congress-run provinces placed in Muslim-majority groups — the source of Congress's core objection.
• 389-member CA: 292 from provincial assemblies + 4 from Chief Commissioner's provinces + 93 from princely states. Do NOT confuse with other numbers.
• League accepted first, Congress second: League accepted on June 6; Congress on June 24, 1946 — NOT the other way around.
• Nehru's July 10 statement triggered the League's withdrawal (July 29) — this precise cause-effect sequence is frequently tested.
• Direct Action Day: August 16, 1946 — NOT August 15 (which is Independence Day, 1947).
• Interim Government sworn in: September 2, 1946 — NOT after independence. It was under British rule with Wavell still as Viceroy.
• League joined Interim Government: October 26, 1946 — without withdrawing 'direct action' or accepting the Cabinet Mission plan.

---

• Two strands of 1945–47 upsurge: negotiations + militant mass action
• Labour govt (Attlee, Pethick Lawrence): Jul 1945
• Elections announced: Aug 1945; CA announcement: Sep 1945
• Three upsurges: Nov 21 (Calcutta, INA), Feb 11 (Calcutta, Rashid Ali), Feb 18 (Bombay, RIN/HMIS Talwar)
• RIN: 1100 ratings; tricolour + crescent + hammer-sickle flags; surrender Feb 23 after Patel+Jinnah assurance
• INA trial defendants: Sehgal (Hindu) + Shah Nawaz (Muslim) + Dhillon (Sikh); Red Fort; Nov 1945
• INA defence lawyers: Bhulabhai Desai, Sapru, Katju, Nehru, Asaf Ali
• Congress: 57/102 Central seats, 91% non-Muslim vote; League: 30/30 reserved seats, 86.6% Muslim vote
• Cabinet Mission: Pethick Lawrence (chair), Cripps, A.V. Alexander; arrived Mar 24, 1946
• Cabinet Mission rejected Pakistan on 5 grounds; 3-section grouping (A, B, C); 389-member CA
• League accepted Jun 6; Congress Jun 24, 1946
• Nehru statement Jul 10 → League withdrawal Jul 29 → Direct Action Aug 16
• Interim Govt: Sep 2, 1946; League joins Oct 26, 1946 (Liaqat = Finance)
• First CA meeting: Dec 9, 1946; Objectives Resolution by Nehru; League absent
• Feb 1947: Congress demands League quit; League demands CA dissolved
• Communalism — 3 stages: communal nationalism → liberal communalism → extreme communalism
• Muslim League founded 1906: Agha Khan, Salimullah, Mohsin-ul-Mulk, Waqar-ul-Mulk
• Separate electorates: Morley-Minto 1909; Communal Award 1932 accepted all 14 Jinnah points
• Extreme communalism post-1937: League's response to poor election performance; Rahmat Ali + Iqbal had earlier articulated separate Muslim nation idea